Bahrain and Libya: Risk outlook

Bahrain

Analysis: On 16 March 2011, the Bahraini Defence Force announced that a curfew had been imposed for Pearl Roundabout and the adjacent financial district, from 16:00-04:00 local time. A protest march planned for 15:30 in al-Budayyi', west of Manama, failed to materialise, and no outbreaks of unrest have been reported since Pearl Roundabout and key roads around the Financial Harbour were forcibly cleared by Bahraini security forces backed up by troops from Saudi Arabia and (to a lesser extent) the UAE. Protesters were easily overwhelmed by security forces and, to the extent that they inflicted casualties or damage, had to resort to using Molotov cocktails and setting fire to their own tents. Key ports continue to operate but at a slower rate due to a reported shortage of workers. Al-Wefaq, the largest opposition group, has distanced itself from the protest movement, and leaders of the hardline al-Haq opposition party, which supported the protests, have been arrested.

Risk Implications: The risk of large-scale protests in Manama has fallen significantly, as security forces appear to have sufficiently intimidated would-be protesters and, more importantly, the Shia-led opposition remains divided. There is likely to be some delays at ports including Sitra, Mina Salman and al-Hadd, and business disruption in the financial district of the capital. This is due in part to the curfew, which will probably be in place for up to a week, but also to some employees' reluctance to go to work until they feel assured that security has been restored in the area. Saudi tourists constitute around 70% of foreign visitors to Bahrain, and are critical to its hospitality and entertainment sectors. They are far less likely to visit in the 30-day outlook, as there is likely to be deep popular resentment towards them amongst Bahraini Shia, given Saudi military intervention and participation in quelling unrest in Bahrain.

Libya

Analysis: On 17 March 2011, the UN Security Council is due to vote on imposing a No-Fly-Zone (NFZ) over Libya. It is likely that a resolution will pass. However, a key question is whether it will be limited to preventing Gaddafi from using air power against civilian targets, or will also authorise selective airstrikes on Gaddafi's command and control assets and ground forces to prevent the use of artillery and armour in civilian population centres. (The US military have argued that without the latter authorisation an NFZ would be of limited effectiveness.)

We expect Gaddafi's forces to intensify their ground and air offensive on Misurata and Ajdabiya in the hope of achieving a decisive result before implementation of an NFZ. However, Misurata and Ajdabiya are unlikely to be taken within 48 hours, and, until they are secured, forces are unlikely to be released in sufficient strength to attempt to retake the much larger city of Benghazi. (There have been defections reported from Khamis Brigade units fighting in Misurata.) A dash for Benghazi by a token government force, leaving Ajdabiya in rebel hands but encircled, in order to secure a foothold in the city, and a symbolic 'victory,' is a likely course of action. In anticipation of the NFZ, Gaddafi has intensified bombing of Benaina Airport near Benghazi, justifying it as a military target.

If the UNSC resolution passes with authorisation for targeting of selected ground force targets, limited enforcement of a NFZ from Brega to Benghazi could begin within 24 hours, with USMC Harriers and other immediately-available aircraft using forward-basing available at Sigonella in Sicily. The NFZ could be expanded to the entire Libyan coast within 72 hours, with a build-up of air power in Sicily and the move of the USS Enterprise carrier group into the Mediterranean from the Red Sea. It is likely that operations would begin around Ajdabiya, where risks to civilians would be minimal, before the targeting of forces in Sirte, Sebha and Misurata. The fact that Coalition air power will not be involved in close support of US ground forces means that there will be a reduced risk of collateral civilian casualties, which the US and its NFZ partners will be anxious to keep to a minimum. Some civilian casualties are, however, likely to result from the neutralisation of Gaddafi's ground air defences located in populated areas.

Risk Implications: There are likely to be further air attacks on Benaina Airport and on other targets in and around Benghazi that Gaddafi can claim to be military targets; indiscriminate airstrikes on civil population centres are less likely, given the risk that they will accelerate the imposition of an NFZ. Misurata and Ajdabiya are likely to be subjected to heavy artillery fire, but Gaddafi's artillery is unlikely to get within range of Benghazi.